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MERTON AND THE HOT TUB:
SCIENTIFIC CONVENTIONS AND
EXPERT EVIDENCE IN AUSTRALIAN
CIVIL PROCEDURE
GARY EDMOND*
The ethos of science in that affectively toned complex of values and norms which
is held to be binding on the man of science. The norms are expressed in the form of
prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences, and permissions. They are legitimized in
terms of institutional values. . . .
...
Four
sets
of
institutional
imperatives—universalism,
communism,
disinterestedness, organized skepticism—are taken to comprise the ethos of modern
1
science.
Robert K. Merton, Science and Technology in a Democratic Order (1942)

hot tub n
A large round bathtub filled with hot water for one or more people to relax, bathe, or
socialize in; Jacuzzi trademark.
ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2008)

I
INTRODUCTION
This article explores the continuing influence of scientific conventions on
legal practice and law reform. Focused on the introduction of “concurrent
evidence,” it describes how changes to Australian civil procedure, motivated by
judicial concerns about the prevalence of partisanship among expert witnesses,
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may have been enfeebled because they were based upon enduring scientific
conventions such as the “ethos of science.”2
Historically, adversarial legal systems have left the selection and refinement
of evidence to the parties. This devolution, sometimes referred to as “free
proof,” applies to all kinds of evidence, including expert evidence.3 Recently in
Australia, common-law judges began to modify the way expert evidence is
prepared and presented. Judges from a range of civil jurisdictions have
conscientiously sought to reduce expert partisanship and the extent of expert
disagreement in an attempt to enhance procedural efficiency and improve
access to justice. One of these reforms, concurrent evidence, enables expert
witnesses to participate in a joint session with considerable testimonial latitude.
This represents a shift away from an adversarial approach and a conscientious
attempt to foster scientific values and norms.
This article describes the environment out of which concurrent evidence
emerged as well as the operation of concurrent evidence and related pretrial
activities. It then reproduces the primary justifications for concurrent evidence
before undertaking a more critical review based on observations, interviews,
and engagement with specialist literatures.
II
PROBLEMS WITH EXPERT EVIDENCE: ADVERSARIAL BIAS, COST, AND DELAY
It is not only U.S. litigants and commentators who have attributed serious
socio-legal problems to expert evidence.4 Over the last decade, English and
Australian judges have become increasingly anxious about the quality of expert
evidence appearing in courts, particularly in their civil-justice systems. An
influential survey of judges and magistrates undertaken at the turn of the
millennium identified bias and partisanship as the most pressing problems with
expert evidence in Australia.5 According to its authors, judges “identified
partisanship or bias on the part of expert witnesses as an issue about which they
were concerned and in respect of which they thought that there needed to be
change.”6 In response, Australian judges and law-reform agencies have focused
their attention on “adversarial bias,” the partisanship associated with the

2. See MERTON, supra note 1, at 268–70.
3. ANDREW LIGERTWOOD, AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE (4th ed. 2004).
4. See, e.g., Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 50–55 (1901) (examining the various methods of utilizing expert evidence). See
generally PETER HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1990)
(polemical account of the negative impacts of dubious scientific evidence and practices on legal and
social outcomes).
5. IAN FRECKELTON, PRASUNA REDDY & HUGH SELBY, AUSTRALIAN JUDICIAL
PERSPECTIVES ON EXPERT EVIDENCE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (1999).
6. Id. at 113. For criticism of this study, see Gary Edmond, Judging Surveys: Experts, Empirical
Evidence and Law Reform, 33 FED. L. REV. 95, 127–35 (2005).
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alignment or identification of an expert with a party and its interests.7 Concerns
about adversarial bias have led senior judges to change the rules of civil
procedure in an attempt to discipline expert witnesses.
In order to understand the Australian legal context in which these
developments occurred, it is useful to describe developments in England and to
distinguish them from those in the United States. Like the United States,
Australia is a federation composed of states and adversarial jurisdictions. Since
European settlement, Australians have, with a few exceptions, looked to
England for legal authority and law-reform initiatives. One reform, in
particular, dramatically changed the Australian civil-justice landscape. By the
late 1980s, most Australian jurisdictions had followed the English lead and
effectively abolished the civil jury.8 Consequently, the vast majority of civil
litigation in Australia is now heard and decided by a single judge. The elevation
of legally trained judges to fact finder has changed many of the rules and trial
dynamics in civil litigation.9
During the last decade, in the wake of a prominent inquiry into civil justice
undertaken by Lord Woolf and subsequent, substantial procedural reform in
England, Australian judges began to modify their rules of civil procedure.
Concerns with expert evidence, particularly concerns about partisanship and
the costs associated with adversarial legal procedures, were prominent in
Woolf’s Access to Justice report and subsequent reforms to the English Civil
Procedure Rules.10 Throughout his inquiry, Woolf openly expressed
dissatisfaction with the proliferation of expert witnesses and the growth of a
“litigation support industry.”11
Following the English example, Australian law-reform commissions and
senior judges recommended and instituted a range of generic reforms in an
attempt to reduce adversarial bias as well as the costs and delays widely
attributed to the provision of expert evidence. These aims were embodied in
legislation such as the Civil Procedure Act, enacted in 2005 in New South Wales,
which provides that “the practice and procedure of the court should be
implemented with the object of resolving the issues between the parties in such
a way that the costs to the parties is proportionate to the importance and
complexity of the subject-matter in dispute.”12 The objectives of the Act aspire

7. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, EXPERT WITNESSES (REPORT 109) 71 (2005);
see also AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, MANAGING JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (REPORT 89) ¶ 1.121 (2000) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the adversarial
system).
8. There is no constitutional guarantee of a civil jury in Australia. See BERNARD CAIRNS,
AUSTRALIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 506–536 (6th ed. 2005).
9. Also, in most Australian civil jurisdictions, costs are normally awarded against the unsuccessful
party. Id. at 469–471.
10. Civil Procedure Rules, 1999 (Eng. & Wales).
11. HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES Ch. 13, ¶¶ 1–2 (1996).
12. Civil Procedure Act, 2005, § 60 (N.S.W.).
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to the “just, quick and cheap resolution of . . . proceedings.”13 The formal
rationale behind concurrent evidence links this new procedure to an
institutional ethos motivated by the need for more-efficient legal practice and
more-impartial expert advice. Though not adopted from England, the practice
of introducing concurrent evidence corresponds with an express commitment to
improving legal processes and public access to law.14
Notwithstanding apprehension about bias, Australian judges have
maintained a more liberal posture toward expert evidence than have most U.S.
courts. They have not, for example, developed a particularly exclusionary
approach to admissibility decisionmaking.15 As the primary fact finders in civil
litigation, Australian judges retain considerable influence over expert evidence
even after admission. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Australian judges have
not had to develop an exclusionary jurisprudence to manage their dockets or
become gatekeepers to prevent juries from hearing marginal expert evidence.16
They can, for example, moderate the interpretation and weight they attach to
expert evidence in their written decisions. 17 In consequence, the Daubert trilogy
and concerns about the reliability of expert evidence have exerted very limited
influence in Australia (and England).18
III
WHAT IS CONCURRENT EVIDENCE?
Basically, concurrent evidence (also known by the sobriquet, “hot tub”) is a
civil procedure employed when parties have secured the services of experts and
those experts disagree about one or more issues pertinent to the resolution of a
dispute.19 Concurrent evidence enables experts from similar or closely related
fields to testify together during a joint session. The openings of these sessions
tend to be more informal than examination-in-chief (that is, direct) and crossexamination, which are associated with conventional adversarial proceedings.
For at least part of their testimony, experts are freed from the constraints of
formally responding to lawyers’ questions. During concurrent-evidence

13. Id. § 56.
14. See Peter McClellan, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W., Address Before
the Expert Witness Institute of Australia and the University of Sydney Faculty of Law: The New Rules
(Apr. 16, 2007), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/
SCO_mcclellan160407.
15. See Gary Edmond, Specialised Knowledge, The Exclusionary Discretions and Reliability:
Reassessing Incriminating Expert Opinion Evidence, 31 U. N.S.W. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2008) (examining
Australian judges’ reluctance to exclude or limit expert evidence).
16. Id. at 49–55.
17. Id.
18. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner 522 U.S.
136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). For Australian cases, see, for example,
R v. Tang, (2006) 65 N.S.W.L.R. 681. For England, see, for example, R v. Gilfoyle, [2001] 2 A.C. 57
(Crim. Div.); R v. Dallagher, [2003] 1 A.C. 195 (Crim. Div.).
19. See King v. Military Rehab. and Comp. Comm’n (2005) 83 A.L.D. 322, ¶ 22 (Admin. App.
Trib.).
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sessions, expert witnesses are usually presented with an opportunity to make
extended statements, comment on the evidence of the other experts, and are
sometimes encouraged to ask each other questions and even test opposing
opinions.
The extracts below illustrate some of the ways in which concurrent evidence
operates in practice. In the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales,
[a]t trial, the experts are sworn in and give evidence at the same time. It is often useful
to have a written agenda of matters to be dealt with in oral evidence. The experts have
an opportunity to explain their position on an issue and to question the other witness
or witnesses about their position. Questions are also asked by counsel for the parties
and the judge. In effect, the evidence is given through discussion in which the experts,
the advocates and the judge participate. Questions and discussion on a particular issue
20
by all experts can be completed before moving on to the next issue.

A second description, taken from a decision by Justice Lockhart in the
Trade Practices Tribunal, is one of the earliest documented examples of a
concurrent-evidence procedure in operation.
Four expert witnesses in the field of economics furnished statements and were
examined orally before the Tribunal at the hearing. The Tribunal adopted the
following procedure with respect to expert witnesses, for the purpose of obtaining the
maximum benefit from their evidence and removing them from the adversary process
as far as possible:
• At the conclusion of all the evidence (other than the evidence of the experts) and
before the commencement of addresses, each expert was sworn immediately after
the other and in turn gave an oral exposition of his or her expert opinion with
respect to the relevant issues arising from the evidence.
• Each expert then in turn expressed his or her opinion about the opinions
expressed by the other experts.
• Counsel then cross-examined the experts, being at liberty to cross-examine on the
basis (a) that questions could be put to each expert in the customary fashion (i.e.
one after the other completing the cross-examination of one before proceeding to
the next), or (b) that questions could be put to all or any of the experts, one after
the other, in respect of a particular subject, then proceeding to the next subject. Reexamination [re-direct] was conducted on the same basis.
In the result we gained assistance from the evidence of the experts. Their oral
21
expositions and examinations occupied only three and one-half hours.

Concurrent evidence sessions usually involve two to four experts, although
they can be considerably larger. It is not uncommon to hold several concurrentevidence sessions during a single proceeding, each featuring different types of
experts. It is also not uncommon for experts from different fields to be joined in
the determination of a single issue. The following examples are drawn from the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), a federal body responsible for merits
reviews of administrative decisions. The case involved a challenge to the
20. Peter Biscoe, Judge, Land & Env’t Court of N.S.W., Address at the Australasian Conference of
Planning and Environment Courts and Tribunals, Expert Witnesses: Recent Developments in New
South Wales (Sept. 16, 2006), ¶ 15, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lec/ll_lec.nsf/
vwFiles/Speech_16Sept06_BiscoeJ_Expert_Witness.doc/$file/Speech_16Sept06_BiscoeJ_Expert_Witne
ss.doc (emphases added); see also Stockland Dev. Pty Ltd. v. Manly Council, No. 10428, 2004 WL
1926821 (N.S.W. Land & Env’t Ct., Aug. 3, 2004); BGP Prop. Pty Ltd. v. Lake Macquarie City Council,
(2004) 138 L.G.E.R.A. 237, 263.
21. Re Queensl. Indep. Wholesalers Ltd. (1995) 132 A.L.R. 225, 231–32.
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determination of the geographical boundary for the Coonawarra, one of
Australia’s most prestigious wine regions. Experts in viticulture, horticulture,
hydrology, and wine production comprised the first panel in the “hot tub.” The
second panel of experts likewise included viticulturists, but had as well experts
in cartography, geography, and soil science.22 Other panels were composed of
historians and those with expertise in the marketing of wine.23 The large number
of experts and range of their specializations may not be entirely representative,
but these examples provide some indication of how the concurrent evidence
sessions can combine experts from a range of disparate, though contextually
related, specializations.
Most of the concurrent-evidence sessions I have observed break down into
two quite distinct parts. The first stage represents a major shift from
conventional adversarial proceedings. During this stage, all of the experts are
asked to comment, sometimes in very general terms, about the case, the issues,
their opinions, and the differences between them. These comments can be
protracted and are sometimes punctuated by questions from the lawyers, the
judge, and even the other experts participating in the session. The questions, at
least initially, tend to be of an elucidatory nature. Once each of the experts has
explained her position, she usually supplements her initial testimony with
comments on the opinions and testimony of the other experts. The judge, rather
than the lawyers, often presides over this first stage. Sometimes the judge
suggests topics and directs the experts to comment on legally relevant issues. It
is common for judges to ask questions and not uncommon for them to ask lots
of questions. At the end of this first stage (or sometimes at the end of the entire
concurrent-evidence session), the experts are usually asked if there is anything
they would like to add, qualify, or clarify.
The second stage of the concurrent-evidence session more closely resembles
the conventional adversarial trial. Here, the lawyers reassert control by
directing questions to the expert witnesses. Usually, there is little need for
examination-in-chief and the lawyers begin by cross-examining the opposing
experts in the usual order. The presence of several expert witnesses allows
questions to be put to more than one witness, and witnesses can be asked to
comment on the other experts’ answers. During the second stage, because of the
attempt to produce a less adversarial environment, the lawyers (usually
barristers) are not always sure about their entitlement to vigorously crossexamine, and experts are sometimes uncertain about the extent of their
constraint.
Variations in practice reflect not only institutional traditions and rules (or
lack of rules) associated with the different courts and tribunals in which

22. Re Coonawarra Penola Wine Indus. Ass’n Inc., No. S2000/182, ¶¶ 61, 65 (Admin. App. Trib.,
Oct. 5, 2001), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/2001.
23. See Gary Edmond, Disorder with Law: Determining the Geographical Indication for the
Coonawarra Wine Region, 27 ADEL. L. REV. 59, 158–60 (2006) (documenting a contentious dispute
over geographical boundaries and the application of scientific-expert evidence).
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concurrent evidence is received, but also differences between cases, the
predilections of judges and lawyers, as well as the number, type, and experience
of experts. Depending on how concurrent-evidence sessions are
operationalized, varying degrees of control are retained by lawyers or obtained
by the experts and the judge (at the expense of the lawyers).
The introduction of concurrent evidence has been supplemented by a
number of interrelated reforms.24 The most significant of these reforms are the
pretrial joint meeting (also known as a joint conference or conclave), which
leads to the production of a joint report, and the imposition of a formal code of
conduct.
Aspiring to make trials run more efficiently, many Australian courts now
require experts from related fields to meet, preferably face-to-face and usually
in the absence of lawyers, prior to the trial.
Before giving evidence, experts of the same discipline confer and produce a joint
report which sets out the matters on which they agree, the matters on which they
disagree and their reasons for disagreement. This enables the Court to identify the
differences which remain between them and which require resolution through their
25
oral evidence.

These meetings are intended to enable the experts to identify the extent of their
agreement or disagreement, resolve or narrow differences, and reduce their
respective positions to writing in the form of a joint report that they are
required to endorse. This joint report, it is hoped, will help to procure
settlement. Ordinarily, only the areas of disagreement will be “live” should the
case proceed to trial.
During the joint conferences “an expert witness must exercise his or her
independent, professional judgment . . . and must not act on any instruction or
request to withhold or avoid agreement. An expert should not assume the role
of advocate for any party during the course of discussions at the joint
conference.”26 The expectation that experts will be independent and
professional servants of the court (and justice) is longstanding.27
In Australia, these expectations are now formally elaborated in a related
series of reforms. In the late 1990s, in response to Woolf’s review and domestic
concerns about the detrimental effects of bias, Australian judges began to
impose codes of conduct on expert witnesses.28 These codes represent an
attempt to eradicate the partisan culture widely associated with expert
witnessing. Now expert witnesses in most Australian jurisdictions are required

24. Several Australian jurisdictions have embarked on more-fundamental reforms, which include
encouraging parties to select a joint (or single) expert between them or risk the court appointing one.
See, e.g., Geoffrey Davies, Current Issues—Expert Evidence: Court Appointed Experts, 23 CIV. JUST. Q.
367 (2004) (describing disadvantages of the adversarial system).
25. Biscoe, supra note 20, ¶ 15; see also Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 2005, § 31.26 (N.S.W.).
26. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 2005, § 31.23 (N.S.W.).
27. See TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 18–22 (2004).
28. See, e.g., Federal Court Rules, Order 34 A.3 (Austl.).

09_EDMOND__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC

166

4/2/2009 11:15:21 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 72:159

to comply with a formal protocol and to sign a declaration to that effect in every
case. These codes explicitly and unambiguously emphasize that “an expert
witness is not an advocate for a party.”29 Rather, an “expert witness’s
paramount duty is to the court and not to any party in the proceedings.”30 In
addition, the codes require expert witnesses to work cooperatively; “endeavor
to reach agreement”; list facts and assumptions on which their opinions are
based; identify any literature, materials, “examinations, tests, or other
investigations” relied upon; specify any limitations of their opinions; and
indicate if their opinion is inconclusive or requires further research or data.31
Although codes of conduct and formal declarations represent an attempt to
regulate the performance of experts that predates the institutionalization of
concurrent evidence, the codes are now used in conjunction with all procedures
pertaining to expert witnesses. The duties emanating from the codes, along with
the underlying model of expertise, are consistent with the expectations for
conduct in pretrial meetings, the production of joint reports, and the
concurrent-evidence sessions.
IV
MARKETING “HOT TUBS”
The basic concurrent-evidence technique emerged out of experiments in the
1970s.32 Since that time, with the support of judges like Lockhart, Lindgren, and
Heerey, this technique was used intermittently in tribunals and very
occasionally in the Federal Court of Australia.33 The institutionalization of
concurrent evidence, however, is a far more recent development.34 In the last
five years, concurrent-evidence procedures have been formally adopted in the
Federal Court, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Supreme Courts of
New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory,35 and the Land and
Environment Court of New South Wales; it has also been used selectively in the
superior courts of New Zealand.36

29. FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA, PRACTICE DIRECTION: GUIDELINES FOR EXPERT
WITNESSES IN PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA (2008), available at
http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/how/prac_direction.html#current.
30. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 2005, § 3.13 (N.S.W.).
31. Id. at Schedule 7, § 31.23. These were derived from English cases, such as: Ikerian Reefer,
[1995] 1 A.C. 455; R v. Harris, [2005] 1 A.C. 5; R v. B, [2006] 2 A.C. 3.
32. See, e.g., Re Queensl. Indep. Wholesalers Ltd. (1995) 132 A.L.R. 225, 231–32.
33. See, e.g., Re Rosenthal and Repatriation Comm’n, No. N2000/378, 2002 WL 31256991 (Admin.
App. Trib., Oct. 9, 2002).
34. See, e.g., Federal Court Rules, Order 34A.3 (Austl.); Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 2005, §
31.35 (N.S.W); Supreme Court Rules, 2006, (Austl. Cap. Terr.).
35. Id.
36. Prominent case law examples include Alphapharm Pty Ltd. v. H. Lundbeck A/S, No. 1120,
2008 WL 1891368, ¶ 58 (Austl., Apr. 24, 2008); Int’l Fund for Animal Welfare (Austl.) Pty Ltd. v.
Minister for Env’t and Heritage (2006) 93 A.L.D. 625, ¶¶ 43–45 (Admin. App. Trib.); Walker Co. v.
Sydney Harbour Foreshore Auth., No. 30024, ¶¶ 1–13 (N.S.W. Land & Env’t Ct., Apr. 19, 2004),
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/2004; Powerco Ltd. v. Commerce
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The institutionalization of concurrent evidence has been accompanied by a
publicity campaign dominated by senior members of the Australian judiciary
(also described as “proponents”). The extracts below present the major
arguments advanced in support of the new procedures. The ability to
comprehensively reproduce the primary justifications seems to outweigh the
limited inconvenience of a little repetition.
Experience shows that provided everyone understands the process at the outset,
in particular that it is to be a structured discussion designed to inform the judge and
not an argument between the experts and advocates, there is no difficulty in managing
the hearing. Although I do not encourage it, very often the experts who will be sitting
next to each other, normally in the jury box in the courtroom, end up referring to each
other on first name terms. Within a short time of the discussion commencing, you can
feel the release of the tension which normally infects the evidence gathering process.
Those who might normally be shy or diffident are able to relax and contribute fully to
the discussion.
This change in procedure has met with overwhelming support from the experts
and their professional organisations. They find that they are better able to
communicate their opinions and, because they are not confined to answering the
questions of the advocates, are able to more effectively respond to the views of the
other expert or experts. They believe that there is less risk that their expertise will be
distorted by the advocate’s skill. It is also significantly more efficient. Evidence which
may have required a number of days of examination in chief and cross-examination
can now be taken in half or as little as 20% of the time which would have been
necessary.
As far as the decision-maker is concerned, my experience is that because of the
opportunity to observe the experts in conversation with each other about the matter,
together with the ability to ask and answer each others questions, the capacity of the
judge to decide which expert to accept is greatly enhanced. Rather than have a
person’s expertise translated or coloured by the skill of the advocate, and as we know
the impact of the advocate is sometimes significant, you actually have the expert’s own
37
views expressed in his or her own words.
Peter McClellan, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W.
One assumption of the adversarial system is that argument between people (even
heated argument) is the most satisfactory means of resolving a controversy. It accepts
that parameters of the debate and the management of the process will be controlled
by advocates for whom the intellectual integrity of the outcome is not imperative.
Their concern is to advance the interests of the client. We accept this approach to
resolving factual questions, which involve a challenge to a witness’s recollection,
credibility or reliability. We have, I suggest, without much thought, accepted the same
approach to experts.
One consequence of the adversarial system is that witnesses, including many
experts, consciously or unconsciously perceive themselves to be on one side or the
other of the argument. Apart from the inefficiencies involved, the process discourages
many of the most qualified experts from giving evidence. It is commonplace to hear
people who have much to offer the resolution of disputes—doctors, engineers, valuers,
accountants and others—comment that they will not subject themselves to a process
which is not efficient in using their time. It is equally common to be told that the

Comm’n, No. 2005 485 1066, ¶ 74 (N.Z., June 9, 2006), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/nz/cases/
NZHC/2006.
37. Peter McClellan, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W., Address at the
LAWASIA Conference: Expert Witnesses—The Experience Of The Land & Environment Court Of
New South Wales (Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lec/ll_lec.nsf/vw
Files/Speech_21Mar05_CJ.doc/$file/Speech_21Mar05_CJ.doc.
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person will not give evidence in a forum where the fundamental purpose of the
participants is to win the argument rather than seek the truth. A process in which they
perceive other experts to be telling “half truths” and which confines them to
answering only “the questions asked” depriving them of the opportunity, as they see
it, to accurately inform the court is rejected as “game playing” and a waste of their
38
time.
Peter McClellan, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W.
In my experience, the Hot Tub procedure brings a number of benefits which include
the following. First, the experts give evidence at a time when the critical issues have
been refined and the area of real dispute narrowed to the bare minimum. Secondly,
the judge sees the opposing experts together and does not have to compare a witness
giving evidence now with the half-remembered evidence of another expert given
perhaps some weeks previously and based on assumptions which may have been
destroyed or substantially qualified in the meantime. Thirdly, the physical removal of
the witness from his party’s camp into the proximity of a (usually) respected
professional colleague tends to reduce the level of partisanship. Fourthly, the
39
procedure can save a lot of hearing time.
Peter Heerey, Judge of the Federal Court of Australia
Concurrent evidence can have a number of virtues over the traditional process:
1. The evidence on one topic is all given at the same time.
2. The process refines the issues to those that are essential.
3. Because the experts are confronting one another, they are much less likely to act
adversarially.
4. A narrowing and refining of areas of agreement and disagreement is achieved
before cross-examination.
5. Cross-examination takes place in the presence of all the experts so that they can
40
immediately be asked to comment on answers of colleagues.
Garry Downes, Judge of the Federal Court of Australia and President of the AAT
Requiring all evidence to be given concurrently reduced the importance of crossexamination by lawyers and increased the importance of questions designed to elicit
41
the common ground, the areas of divergence and the reasons for divergence.
Brian Preston, Chief Judge of the Land and Environment Court of N.S.W.

According to these judges, concurrent evidence transforms the agonistic
adversarial trial into a more cooperative enterprise in which scientific attitudes
and values are afforded opportunities to manifest and flourish. The main
benefits attributed to concurrent evidence (and associated procedural reforms)
might be summarized as follows:

38. Peter McClellan, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W., Address at the
Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales Annual Conference: Expert Evidence—Aces Up
Your Sleeve (Oct. 20, 2006), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.
nsf/pages/SCO_mcclellan 201006.
39. Peter Heerey, Recent Australian Developments, 23 CIV. JUST. Q. 386, 391 (2004).
40. Garry Downes, Judge of the Fed. Court of Austl., Address at the Inter-Pacific Bar Association
Conference: The Use of Expert Witnesses In Court and International Arbitration Processes (May 3,
2006), available at http://www.aat.gov.au/SpeechesPapersAndResearch/speeches/downes/UseExpert
WitnessesMay2006.htm.
41. Brian Preston, Chief Judge of the Land & Env’t Court of N.S.W., Address Before the
Australian Environmental Business Network: Ongoing Reforms of Practice and Procedure (June 16,
2006), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lec/ll_lec.nsf/vwFiles/Paper_14Jun06_Preston
_Reforms.doc/$file/Paper_14Jun06_Preston_Reforms.doc.
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Textual support /
Footnote42

Virtues
Concurrent evidence embodies the scientific ethos: it
provides a discursive, cooperative environment and
facilitates peer review.
Experts like concurrent evidence.
Concurrent evidence reduces partisanship
(i.e., “adversarial bias”).
Concurrent evidence enhances communication,
comprehension, and decisionmaking.
Concurrent evidence reduces the influence of the
lawyers.
Concurrent evidence saves time, money, and
institutional resources.

19, 20, 36, 37,
38, 39, 40
36, 37
36, 37, 38, 39
19, 20, 36,
38, 39, 40
36, 40
20, 24, 36,
37, 38, 39

V
MORE CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
Now we can start to turn up the heat on the “hot tub” and reconsider some
of the assumptions and advantages used to justify its introduction and use.
Although many of these issues require further empirical investigation, some
observations based on contributions from historians and sociologists, along with
the responses of those who have participated in concurrent-evidence sessions,
can contribute to the fire.
A. The Scientific Ethos?
Proponents contend that, unlike conventional adversarial procedures,
concurrent evidence embodies the values of science or allows the scientific
ethos to more readily surface.43 Codes of conduct, pretrial meetings (without
lawyers), and concurrent-evidence sessions are credited with facilitating a
cooperative “discussion,” which allows the experts to assist the court in
reaching a decision more effectively. Settlement and resolution are more readily
facilitated because the proximity of peers provides a powerful disciplining

42. “Textual support” refers to extracts reproduced throughout this article and AUSTL. LAW
REFORM COMM’N, Review of The Adversarial System of Litigation: Issues Paper 24, 7.10 (1998),
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/issues/24/ALRCIP24.html; see also
AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, MANAGING JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(REPORT 89) (2000); ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL, AN EVALUATION OF THE USE OF CONCURRENT
EVIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL (2005).
43. See sources supporting “Virtue 1” in Table, asserting that concurrent evidence embodies the
scientific ethos. See, e.g., McClellan, supra notes 37–38.
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influence.44 Further, experts may prefer concurrent evidence because of the
familiar, cooperative approach to resolving disagreement and uncertainty.
Proponents, appealing to scientific norms and the efficacy of peer participation,
suggest that concurrent evidence provides a means of securing less-partisan and
less-extreme expert advice.45 Unfortunately, these justifications are predicated
upon romanticized images of expertise and expert disagreement.46 Thus, it is
useful to make a few remarks about judicial appeals to the “ethos of science”
and peer review.
The sociologist Robert Merton offered an early and highly influential
account of scientific norms and their social functions. His work suggested that
norms like “universalism,” “communism,” “disinterestedness,” and “organized
skepticism” were central to scientific activity.47 Lacking Merton’s sociological
and historical sophistication, modern reformers routinely (and unwittingly)
promote elements of his sociology—developed in response to the rise of fascism
in the 1930s—as some kind of timeless prescription for all authentic scientific
activity.48 This not only caricatures Merton’s work on the normative structure of
science but removes his scholarship from its historical context. To the extent
that Australian legal reforms are based, even loosely, around such normative
constructs, they trivialize both modern sociological endeavors and, more
importantly, changes to scientific and biomedical practice.
More recent sociological investigation suggests that the norms described by
Merton are unlikely to guide scientific practice or assessments of scientific
knowledge. Appealing as norms may be, they are not prescriptive, and in many
contexts they are open to inconsistent, though potentially legitimate,
interpretations.49 Norms such as “disinterestedness,” “communalism,” and
“organized skepticism” encounter more fundamental difficulties when
considered in the context of changes to the organization and funding of
scientific and biomedical research in the post-war era. The growth of
pharmaceutical companies and the rise of biotech start-ups—in response to

44. Id.
45. See sources supporting “Virtue 3” in Table, supra p. 160, asserting that concurrent evidence
reduces partisanship.
46. See Gary Edmond, Judicial Representations of Expert Evidence, 63 MOD. L. REV. 216 (2000)
(examining inconsistencies in the way scientific evidence is represented in legal proceedings and
judgments); see also DAVID CAUDILL & LEWIS LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF
SCIENCE IN THE LAW 49, 54–55 (2006) (noting the loose boundaries between social factors and
scientific inquiry and practice).
47. See MERTON, supra note 1, at 266–78. “Communalism” and “communality” are often
substituted for “communism.”
48. See, e.g., McClellan, supra note 38.
49. See Michael Mulkay, Norms and Ideology in Science, 15 SOC. SCI. INFO. 637–56 (1976)
(discussing the roles of norms in scientific activity); Michael Mulkay, Interpretation and the Use of
Rules: The Case of Norms of Science, in SCIENCE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: A FESTSCHRIFT FOR
ROBERT K. MERTON 111 (Tom Gieryn ed., 1980) (discussing the important role of normative
principles on scientific discourse and practice).
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technological breakthroughs, changes to intellectual-property regimes, and the
availability of private capital—are good examples.50
Many of the practical limitations with the normative ethos were explored
through empirical investigation. One study, conducted in the early 1970s,
concluded that NASA scientists routinely contravened Mertonian-style norms.51
Derogations from these norms were so pervasive that the investigator, Ian
Mitroff, developed the idea of the “counter-norm.”52 Mitroff found that his
NASA subjects accounted for their scientific activities using a variety of
explanatory resources. When their behavior seemed to contravene popular
expectations—such as the norms described by Merton—scientists simply
appealed to a range of exceptions and qualifications that helped to legitimize
(or excuse) what might otherwise have been considered aberrant (or even
deviant). It was these principled derogations that were characterized as counternorms.53 Of interest, Mitroff noticed that departures from norms such as
“disinterestedness” and “communalism” did not necessarily correlate with poor
standing or a lack of credibility.54 Some of the most eminent and successful
scientists—based on the standing of their research and institutional
affiliations—were secretive, resented criticism, and adhered to “pet” theories in
the face of adverse evidence. A corollary was that knowledge derived through
secret, noncooperative, and interested activities was not necessarily understood
as pathological or unreliable. These findings are consistent with subsequent
investigations.55
There are also difficulties with judicial appeals to “organized skepticism” in
the guise of peer review. Proponents suggest that the proximity of colleagues
will discipline and constrain expert performances, particularly the incidence of
partisanship and adversarial bias.56 There are good reasons, however, for
believing that peer participation will be less effective than proponents imply.
After all, extensive sociological and biomedical literatures question the value
and efficacy of scientific peer review.57
Without delving into this vast literature, one illuminating issue merits
discussion. While U.S. judges are searching for “reliability” through method

50. See generally PHILIP MIROWSKI, THE EFFORTLESS ECONOMY OF SCIENCE (2004) (discussing
the influence of economics on scientific practice); HELGA NOWOTNY, PETER SCOTT & MICHAEL
GIBBONS, RE-THINKING SCIENCE (2001) (arguing for a fundamental reexamination of the distinction
between society and science).
51. IAN MITROFF, THE SUBJECTIVE SIDE OF SCIENCE 85–88 (1974) (examining the role of
subjective factors in scientific research).
52. Id. at 77.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 73–79.
55. See, e.g., HARRY COLLINS, GRAVITY’S SHADOW (2004) (sociological history of the decadeslong search for evidence of gravitational waves).
56. See, e.g., Heerey, supra note 39.
57. Pervasive assumptions about the efficacy of peer review and publication are critically appraised
in Gary Edmond, Judging the Scientific and Medical Literature: Some Legal Implications of Changes to
Biomedical Research and Publication, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 523, 523–31 (2008).
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discourses (for example, testing), general acceptance, publication, and peer
review, and while English and Australian judges are endeavoring to reduce
adversarial bias through procedural reforms, increasing the proximity of
experts, and facilitating a “discussion,” the world’s leading biomedical journals
have resorted to more legalistic solutions to help them assess the value of
contributions (that is, research papers submitted for publication). Rather than
expose submissions to further peer review or place greater emphasis on formal
adherence to method doctrines, members of the International Committee of
Medical Journal Editors, for example, require information about conflicts of
interest, commercial sponsorship, and the identity of all contributors, and they
now mandate the prospective registration of clinical trials to help them
identify—if not eliminate—forms of bias.58 These pragmatic responses to the
impact of commercial sponsorship, by well-resourced biomedical journals with
technically competent staffs, serve to highlight how the power attributed to
scientific norms and the proximity of peers is not only exaggerated but unlikely
to help judges reliably assess expert disagreement.
More prosaically, in conventional adversarial proceedings expert advisers
and expert witnesses often sit in the courtroom monitoring testimony. These
“opposing” experts have access to expert reports and transcripts. Is it realistic to
think that the concurrent participation of these experts—effectively moving
them a few yards in the courtroom and allowing them to respond during the
same session rather than a day or a week later—will produce a demonstrable
change in behavior?
Australian judges, concerned about the behavior of experts, seem to be
intent on reducing adversarial bias through the provision of a space—in the
adversarial trial and pretrial processes—that is shaped by scientific, rather than
legal, conventions. To the extent that the new procedures have conflated
idealized norms of science with actual scientific practice, this response might be
imprudent. Proponents of concurrent evidence seem to believe that temporarily
marginalizing the lawyers and facilitating a “discussion” in the midst of an
adversarial process will overcome the influence of expert selection and the
experts’ sensitivity to the parties’ causes of action, and, most remarkably,
enable the experts to somehow transcend theoretical and professional
commitments, as well as personal limitations.
B. Partisanship and Adversarial Bias
When it comes to assessing expert evidence, “partisanship” and “adversarial
bias” are not particularly precise or analytically reliable concepts. They tend to
be used selectively to privilege (or discount) particular experts and opinions.

58. INT’L COMM. OF MED. JOURNAL EDITORS, UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS FOR MANUSCRIPTS
SUBMITTED TO BIOMEDICAL JOURNALS: WRITING AND EDITING FOR BIOMEDICAL PUBLICATION §
II.D (2005). The ICMJE is a group of medical-journal editors, which includes participants from, among
others, The New England Journal of Medicine, the Journal of the American Medical Association, the
British Medical Journal, and the Lancet.
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All experts are (and expertise is) more or less aligned, subjective, interested,
biased, and dependent. These alignments, interests, and limitations may assume
a great variety of forms—be they theoretical, professional, institutional,
financial, or personal. Whether (the appearance of) “bias,” “interests,” or
“sponsorship” affects the reliability of expert evidence is a fundamental but
complex issue.59 Although judges and fact finders should seek information about
influences and biases, unfortunately this information will not always expedite
resolution or simplify decisionmaking.60
Procedural reforms based around “objectivity” and “impartiality” offer
limited hope for improving the reception and treatment of expert evidence.61
Not only do these concepts have limited analytical utility, but there is little
evidence to suggest that adversarial bias is deliberate or consistently
detrimental to civil practice. Although experts selected by the different parties
may well take on aspects of a case, based in part on their contractual
relationship, these experts will often be selected because they already adhere to
particular assumptions and commitments or employ methodologies considered
valuable. Even if not conspicuously or predictably aligned, experts (including
court-appointed experts) do not enter disputes without professional,
institutional, and ideological “baggage.”62 Expert selection may be far more
important than any pressures or importunity brought about by adversarial
alignment and interactions with parties and their lawyers.
These observations have serious implications for concurrent evidence, and
for the utility of codes of conduct and expert declarations. Without a reliable
means of identifying deliberate partisanship—as opposed to genuinely held
beliefs and opinions—and its impact on expert evidence, codes of conduct
become abstract formulations with primarily symbolic value. Codes of conduct
affirm the role of the expert as a servant of the court but fail to explain what
that might mean to an expert with theoretical commitments, professional
prejudices, particular visions of social justice, and a range of subsidiary
obligations.
Moreover, if partisanship is prevalent, then its persistence might be a
consequence of the difficulty of appearing impartial along with a widespread
realization that judges have practical problems disciplining partisan experts.
Without more-sophisticated models of expertise, on what grounds are judges to
59. Steven Yearley, The Relationship Between Epistemological and Sociological Cognitive Interests,
13 STUD. HIST. &. PHIL. SCI. 353, 375 (1982). See generally Steve Woolgar, Interests and Explanation in
the Social Study of Science, 11 SOC. STUD. SCI. 365 (1981) (explaining the difficulties of using interests
as explanatory resources).
60. Kenneth Rothman, Conflict Of Interest: The New McCarthyism in Science, 269 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 2782, 2783 (1993) (a critical response to calls for full disclosure of conflicts of interest in
biomedical research).
61. For an account of the socially contingent nature of “objectivity,” see generally LORRAINE
DASTON & PETER GALISON, OBJECTIVITY (2007).
62. See Laura Hooper, Joe Cecil & Thomas Willging, Assessing Causation in Breast Implant
Litigation: The Role of Science Panels, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 151–54 (Autumn 2001)
(describing problems with a court-appointed expert panel in large-scale litigation over breast implants).
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apply sanctions against experts who breach their “duty” to the court or who are
unable to achieve consensus around their opinions? How should judges
determine whether reluctance to agree or to narrow the grounds of
disagreement at a joint meeting or in a “hot tub” constitutes legitimate
professional differences, or obduracy driven by a party’s desire for success at
trial? Do judges possess the technical abilities to distinguish between willful
breaches as opposed to genuine adherence to idiosyncratic views? When is
adherence to a particular “school of thought” partisan and under what
circumstances might it be reasonable or objective? What can judges do when
experts hold firm opinions in areas widely accepted as uncertain or disagree
about the extent of consensus in a field (or even the relevance of the field)? The
recent reforms tell us little about possible sanctions for breaches of duties, or
how such breaches might be ascertained and proved.63
Even if claims about the prevalence of partisanship were not empirically
justified, judicial recourse to problems created by “adversarial bias” and “junk
science” might nevertheless be comprehensible. Institutional and professional
benefits may accrue from the perpetuation of alarm about expert performances,
especially the prevalence of bias and departure from the scientific ethos, in
contexts where judges have to routinely resolve expert disagreement and
explain their reasons for preferring one expert opinion to another.
C. Enhancing Communication and Comprehension
Claims for concurrent evidence are less controversial when restricted to
improving communication and judicial comprehension. Disregarding questions
about partisanship, evidentiary reliability, and the realities of scientific practice,
it would seem difficult to challenge the contention that concurrent evidence has
the potential to improve communication and enhance comprehension in
court—especially if its use dramatically reduces the volume of expert testimony.
If nothing else, concurrent-evidence procedures require the experts to meet and
talk, they enable expert witnesses to give longer explanations using their own
words, they encourage experts to comment directly on the testimony of others,
and they provide a forum where judges are less restricted in their questioning of
witnesses and enable fact finders to observe the interactions between experts.64
Provided concurrent evidence retains provision for vigorous crossexamination, even if the witnesses are no longer quite as restrained or servile,
then it should help to improve communication and comprehension in the trial
and on appeal.65 There are, however, no guarantees that concurrent evidence

63. Though longstanding, judicial concerns about expert partisanship have produced few
disciplinary responses. See, e.g., Lord Abinger v. Ashton, (1873) 17 Ch. D. 358, 374 (noting biases of
paid experts).
64. See generally MISUNDERSTANDING SCIENCE (Alan Irwin & Brian Wynne eds., 1996)
(discussion of socially contingent approaches to expert knowledge).
65. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA 200–216 (1995) (sociological account of the complex relations between law and science).
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will narrow disagreement, encourage cooperation, increase settlement, or
render decisionmaking easier, less controversial, or more accurate.
D. Out of Sight, Out of Mind?
Lawyers may lose some control over expert witnesses during the pretrial
processes and in the more discursive openings of concurrent evidence. Means of
retaining influence and predictability may, nevertheless, be at hand. Procedural
efforts to reduce the ability of lawyers to influence expert evidence may actually
have effects elsewhere in the process, such as in the choice of experts. If lawyers
are excluded from pretrial meetings and marginalized during parts of the trial,
then, in order to maintain some semblance of control and predictability, it will
become increasingly important to select experts who understand what they
need to do in the interests of the case while maintaining professional credibility
before the legal institution.
The introduction of concurrent evidence may encourage lawyers to select
experts who are unlikely to make damaging concessions or to be maneuvered
into compromising concessions by the experts retained by other parties. Many
lawyers will be reluctant to cede control to experts unless they are confident
that their experts understand the tacit rules of the game. Over time it may
become even more important to select experts whose contribution to any open
“discussion” is predictable and effective. Marginalizing lawyers may actually
encourage the use of more-experienced expert witnesses. Ironically, the
litigation specialists who seemed to irritate Lord Woolf may be the kind of
experts that enable lawyers to maintain most control over pretrial proceedings
and the evidence. These experts will be neither swayed nor exposed by codes of
conduct.
The reforms also make the production of the joint report particularly
important. The need to complete joint reports with attention to detail seems to
be an emerging feature of practice. Meeting and completing a binding
(practically if not always technically) joint report adds to the costs of the
pretrial processes. And, because agreement between the experts will tend to
constrain the parties, in practice lawyers will ordinarily have a clear idea of
what their expert will say, and there will be considerable pressure on the expert
to adhere to the terms of the original advice (or report) or a position consistent
with the client’s cause of action.
One further implication—which involves crediting experts with agency—is
that pretrial meetings provide experts with new opportunities and incentives to
manage their participation. Proponents, drawing upon normatively charged
visions of expertise and committed to institutional efficiencies, seem to think
this is desirable.66 In so doing they tend to overlook the shared professional
interests maintained by groups of experts, such as three neurosurgeons, meeting

66. See, e.g., McClellan, supra notes 37–38.
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beyond the surveillance of the lawyers and judge.67 There are, of course,
alternative ways to interpret expert consensus. By agreeing on a joint report,
experts can dispose of suits, limit their exposure to cross-examination, and still
receive substantial compensation for their pretrial activity. To some extent
experts may be able to manage the scope of professional liability and even keep
some disputes in-house. Away from the pressures of the courtroom and the
gaze of the lawyers, experts are empowered to negotiate the terms and limits of
the factual dispute. Once opposing experts strike agreement it will be difficult
to explore the covert realm of expert negotiations or to reopen settled “facts.”
E. Resource Implications and Logistics
In some circumstances, concurrent evidence will reduce the amount of time
required of expert witnesses and may clarify, or even resolve, the issues and
areas of residual disagreement. Unfortunately, at present there are no ready
means to determine which cases will produce these savings or how “quicker”
and more “cost effective” justice should be assessed against more-refractory
values such as fairness, accuracy, or institutional legitimacy.68 The only guides
currently available are institutional presumptions qualified by issues of
proportionality, procedural fairness, convenience, and personal preference.
Concurrent evidence might well reduce costs in large-scale litigation in
which many experts are scheduled to testify. Compelling two, but especially
more, experts to testify simultaneously will often reduce the length of a trial by
allowing them to each give an answer to the same question and to merely
endorse or qualify the opinions of other experts. Also, the lawyers do not have
to reintroduce the various issues or the opinions of other experts over and over.
In some cases, though, having experts provide evidence concurrently will
increase the time they spend in court while reducing the overall length and cost
of the proceedings, themselves.
When experts achieve consensus on substantial issues during the pretrial
stages, more cases may be settled or abandoned. Generally though, the effects
of concurrent evidence and pretrial meetings on settlement are unclear. The
parties will often have solicited expert assistance before the joint meetings. So,
if settlement occurs after these meetings, it will often be more expensive for the
parties (if not for the court). If lawyers select more-predictable and intractable
experts to compensate for their displacement from the pretrial phases, then it
may prove more difficult to narrow the issues or to settle.
A further difficulty arises from the physical layout of Australian
courtrooms. Tribunals and most courts are designed to allow a single witness to

67. See CAROL JONES, EXPERT WITNESSES: SCIENCE, MEDICINE AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
165–193 (1994) (socio-legal account of the role of experts in legal processes in England).
68. Admin. Appeals Tribunal, supra note 42, §§ 2.1, 2.28, 6.2; see also King v. Military Rehab. and
Comp. Comm’n (2005) 83 A.L.D. 322, ¶ 22 (Admin. App. Trib.); Flintstones Garden Supplies Centres
v. Greater Geelong CC, P1775/2006, ¶¶ 41–42 (Admin Trib. (Vict.), Apr. 19, 2007), available at http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2007.
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testify, usually from a dedicated witness box. When it comes to concurrent
evidence, fitting more than two expert witnesses and the many exhibits and
reports associated with expert testimony in these booths is often problematic.
Some courts place the experts in the jury box. However, many tribunals and
courts have neither jury seats nor even much space for the public. In response,
they have improvised, bringing in additional chairs and tables and, in the very
smallest courts, seating the expert witnesses at the bar table opposite the
lawyers. If concurrent evidence is to continue, then there would seem to be a
need to design courts with space for a panel of expert witnesses.
Another logistical difficulty emerges from the potential disorderliness of the
“discussion.” The chorus of different participants, in conjunction with the freeform structure, makes it difficult for anyone trying to record or transcribe the
session to reliably identify speakers.
F. Judicial Independence, Procedural Fairness, and Criminal Justice
Concurrent evidence requires oversight and tends to encourage judicial
intervention. It disrupts the adversarial trial and requires the judge to enable
the experts to speak and comment on each other’s opinions without too much
interference from the lawyers. The judge is also encouraged to ask questions.
Allowing judges to become more active makes sense from the perspective of
communication and comprehension, but increased participation may
simultaneously raise concerns about judicial impartiality and procedural
fairness within adversarial systems, particularly regarding criminal trials.69
Many aspects of concurrent evidence have yet to be considered on appeal.
Of particular concern are issues of procedural fairness (due process) and
perceptions of fairness arising from the way concurrent evidence is
implemented.70 A range of issues create potential problems: How should judges
identify suitable cases? How should judges handle different levels of experience
and confidence among the experts? How similar do the types of expertise have
to be before the session becomes intellectually suspect? What should a judge do
when an affluent party calls several experts against an impecunious litigant with
one or even none? Should the length and vigor of cross-examination be limited?
What should judges do when lawyers object to experts making long speeches
during the first or second stage? What happens if an expert refuses to be
constrained in their answers, appealing to their “paramount duty” to the court?
If concurrent evidence makes a trial or the preparation for a trial more
expensive in a particular case, is it reasonable or fair to expect a party to bear
the additional cost? What happens when experts disagree about what was
actually said during the pretrial meetings or are unable to sensibly negotiate?

69. See Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1033–
35 (1975) (noting the perspective and limitations of judges in the adversarial system’s explication of
truth).
70. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 115–57 (2006) (exploring the public
perceptions of law and legal procedure).
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Parties and their advocates may also argue about when a concurrentevidence session should be held.71 Concurrent evidence disrupts the adversarial
trial because it breaks the continuity of the cases developed by the respective
parties. Concurrent evidence may change the dynamics of adversarial litigation
in some jurisdictions. Unavoidably, concurrent evidence introduces a range of
new strategic decisions.
These issues might not prove insurmountable. Judges and legal institutions,
however, may be vulnerable if parties challenge concurrent evidence (and its
related procedural developments). We have yet to see what appellate courts
will make of concurrent evidence in the absence of much empirical evidence
about costs, speed, veracity of outcomes, or public satisfaction.
Lurking in the background of the recent reforms to civil procedure are the
implications for criminal justice and, in Australia, the jury. In 2001, a senior
judge in New South Wales proposed the cautious extension of pretrial joint
conferences to criminal proceedings. Although Justice Wood recognized that “it
is not always the case that the defense can assemble a team of forensic experts
of equivalent experience and expertise to those who work full time for forensic
science laboratories or police services,” he nevertheless commended pretrial
conferences.72 Wood even provided an example of the advantages: “[D]oubts
entertained by a defense expert may be dispelled by the additional information
or explanation provided in a joint conference, allowing the accused more
comfortably to offer an early plea of guilty, and thereby receive the benefit of
the discounting attaching to that circumstance.”73
The disparity in the resources and experts available to the state provides one
reason for resisting the wholesale extension of pretrial conferences and
concurrent evidence to criminal proceedings.74 Additional concerns arise from
the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. Is it appropriate or
desirable, in adversarial proceedings, to require the defense experts to meet
with the state’s forensic scientists and consultants prior to trial? Should the
defense be obliged to reveal its “hand” or disclose weaknesses in the
prosecution case if such notice will allow the state to repair or change its expert
evidence? There is also a danger that experts, testifying in the more free-form,
concurrent-evidence session, might inadvertently disclose inadmissible or highly
prejudicial information.

71. See Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 2005, § 31.35 (N.S.W.) (listing possibilities for the
presentation of expert evidence).
72. James Wood, Chief Judge at Common Law, Supreme Court of N.S.W., Address at the 8th
Greek Australian International Legal & Medical Conference: Expert Witnesses: The New Era (June
2001), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_speech_
wood_010601.
73. Id.
74. See generally Michael Saks & Jonathan Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic
Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892 (2005) (explaining how many longstanding forensic science
techniques have not been empirically tested).
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VI
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EMERGING PRACTICES
Some of the emerging responses to concurrent evidence merit consideration.
It might not come as a surprise to find that the experiences and impressions of
lawyers, experts, and a wider selection of judges and commissioners, present
more variegated impressions than those of the proponents.
A. Case Lore
Representations of concurrent evidence in published decisions are generally
positive. The most familiar refrains among the growing number of Australian
decisions documenting the use of concurrent evidence (and “hot tubbing”) refer
to the assistance obtained by the fact finder and to the savings in time and,
implicitly, resources. Comments by the Tribunal in Ironbridge Holdings Pty
Ltd. and WA Planning Commission are typical:
The experts are to be commended for having participated in this process in a
professional and diligent manner. While significant professional disagreement
remained between them, their endeavours enabled the Tribunal to quickly grasp
complex issues of traffic engineering involving a number of variables. Had this
evidence been received in the way in which it is in most courts and tribunals, it is likely
to have taken a week or more. In contrast, the concurrent evidence in the Tribunal
75
took less than a day.

Similarly, the use of case-management techniques and concurrent evidence
in Uniting Church Homes, Inc. and City of Stirling meant that the “final hearing
which might well have occupied up to two weeks, took the equivalent of one
hearing day.”76 Taken at face value, the selective use of concurrent evidence
seems to have the potential to radically reduce hearing times.
In other reported decisions, concurrent evidence is linked to cooperative
interactions, concessions, and even agreement. Consider Gangemi and the Shire
of Margaret River:
[D]uring the course of the hearing, [two experts] were requested to confer with each
other to determine the extent to which they agreed as to matters of land capability,
and to identify the issues in respect of which they disagreed. They were then called
together, and gave concurrent evidence. As it happened, the process of consultation
ultimately gave rise to agreement of all issues of land capability, and [the experts]
together prepared a plan depicting the different areas of productive agricultural land
within the lot. Counsel for both sides were extremely co-operative in this process and
can take much credit for its success. The process led to a far more effective resolution
of the matter the subject of the witness’s expertise than might have been expected by
the traditional process of tender of reports and cross examination of each of the
77
witnesses at length on those reports.

75. Ironbridge Holdings Pty Ltd. and WA Planning Comm’n, DR 345, ¶ 44 (Admin. Trib. (W.
Austl.), Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASAT/2007.
76. Uniting Church Homes Inc. and City of Stirling, RD 6, ¶ 31 (Admin. Trib. (W. Austl.), Aug.
19, 2005), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASAT/2005.
77. Gangemi and Shire of Augusta-Margaret River, RD 126, ¶ 26 (Admin. Trib. (W. Austl.), June
2, 2005), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASAT/2005 (emphases added); see also
Brescia v. QBE, No. 50082/05, LEXIS BC200705312, ¶¶ 160–61 (N.S.W., July 6, 2007); Gumana v. N.

09_EDMOND__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC

180

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

4/2/2009 11:15:21 AM

[Vol. 72:159

In cases like Gangemi, when counsel and experts are “extremely
cooperative,” it may be that concurrent evidence will help to narrow or resolve
the dispute. Indeed, in some types of litigation—such as in a planning
jurisdiction (for example, the Land and Environment Court of New South
Wales) where there is considerable scope for creativity, discretion, and
cooperative compromise—pretrial meetings and concurrent evidence might be
especially helpful. One should, however, be careful equating collegiality,
cooperation, and consensus with the absence of partisanship or inferring that
expert agreement or compromise produces accurate or reliable evidence. The
kinds of compromises that can be negotiated between town planners or
geographers in relation to the size of a building or the uses of land, for example,
might not be appropriate in professional negligence proceedings or between
forensic scientists in criminal matters.
Notwithstanding its apparent successes, concurrent evidence does not
invariably save time or help to clarify, or even narrow, areas of disagreement. It
certainly does not guarantee concurrence, compromise, or even civility. In
Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd. v. Ford, Justice Harrison explained that the
concurrent evidence served “to highlight the absence of any likelihood of
agreement between [the expert witnesses] on important issues” and
“degenerated . . . into an interdisciplinary brawl.”78 In Jetset Properties v.
Eurobodalla Shire Council, the proximity of the experts did not generate
concessions, compromise, or moderation.79 In that case, the proximity of peers
seemed to exert little influence, at all:
The opinions of the two sets of experts were far apart. They relied on different
methodologies, used different data and reached different conclusions. Each believed
that the methodology and data used by the other was useless. I detected no hint of
80
recognition on either side of the professional competence of the other.

In Synergy Environmental Planning v. Cessnock City Council (No. 2), the
experts could not even agree on what was said during the pretrial meetings.81
“In this case, the evidence during the hearing showed that the experts, who
could not even reach agreement on a true record of their joint conferences,
remain far apart on technical matters, necessitating a Court decision on the
facts and merits of those issues.”82 In Morrison and Repatriation Commission,
the applicant relied upon the assistance of an expert witness who had limited
familiarity with the medical specialization deemed relevant to the case.83
Terr. (2005) 141 F.C.R. 457, ¶ 173; Winters v. Att’y Gen. of N.S.W., No. 40730/07, 2008 WL 715461, ¶
167 (N.S.W. Ct. App., Mar. 18, 2008).
78. Perpetual Tr. Vict. Ltd. v. Ford, No. 15045, 2008 WL 278422, ¶ 43 (N.S.W., Feb. 1, 2008).
79. Jetset Prop. v. Eurobodalla Shire Council, No. 10685, ¶ 42 (N.S.W. Land & Env’t Ct., May 9,
2007), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/2007.
80. Id.
81. Synergy Envtl. Planning v. Cessnock City Council (No. 2), No. 11353, ¶ 9 (N.S.W. Land &
Env’t Ct., Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/2005.
82. Id.
83. Morrison and Repatriation Comm’n, No. N2005/47 (Admin. App. Trib., Aug. 2, 2006),
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/2006.
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According to the Commission’s decision, this seemed to create confusion and
complexity that was not reduced by concurrent evidence.84
Trial judges have also encountered resistance to the use of concurrent
evidence when the stakes are large and new procedures introduce uncertainty
and risk. In “mega-litigation” over the rights to televise Australian Rules
Football, a federal judge encouraged the parties to use concurrent evidence to
“reduce the areas of disagreement and limit the hearing time required for
exploring the remaining differences.”85 This proposal was “strenuously resisted
by the Respondents”86 and, to the limited extent it was used, did not prevent
one of the experts from displaying “a tendency to argue the case on behalf of
Telstra [a respondent], rather than confine herself to her area of expertise”
despite the presence of other experts.87
Nor can one be confident that concurrent evidence will ease
decisionmaking. Even when the process is orderly and constructive, the
decisionmaker is required to weigh “the differing opinions.” At the hearing in
Rezk and Australian Postal Corporation the experts gave their evidence
concurrently: “Neither expert compromised on [his] initial diagnosis. . . .
The concurrent evidence clarified some elements of the different diagnosis but
still left the tribunal with the task of resolving the differing opinions.”88
Finally, in Halverson v. Dobler, a professional-negligence action, the
concurrent evidence sessions were publicly valorized.89 The main question at
trial was whether the failure to perform an electrocardiogram was negligent and
causally linked to the catastrophic brain injuries suffered by the plaintiff. The
presiding judge, Peter McClellan, the leading proponent of concurrent
evidence, thought the concurrent-evidence sessions proceeded in a “highly
productive and efficient” manner.
Each cardiologist prepared at least one written report and they met prior to giving
their evidence in order to refine the issues falling within their areas of experience.
They gave evidence concurrently, [one expert] participating by way of video link. This
process proved both highly productive and efficient and has been of great benefit to
me in resolving this case. The discussion was sustained at a high level of objectivity by
all participants, each of whom displayed a genuine endeavour to assist the court to
resolve the problems. The fact that ultimately they disagreed on critical issues was not

84. Id.
85. Seven Network Ltd. v. News Ltd., No. 1223, 2007 WL 2137775, ¶ 23 (Austl., July 27, 2007).
86. Id. ¶ 25.
87. Seven Network Ltd. v. News Ltd. (2007) 151 F.C.R. 450, ¶ 14.
88. Rezk and Austl. Postal Co., No. N2002/1720, 2005 WL 165614, ¶¶ 49, 51 (Admin. App. Trib.,
Jan. 18, 2005); see also Reardon and Repatriation Comm’n, No. N2002/1115 ¶ 30 (Admin. App. Trib.,
June 26, 2003), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/2003/ (stating that experts’
individual positions did not change as a result of the concurrent-evidence approach). Contra Gibbins
and Austl. Postal Co., No. N2002/1655, 2003 WL 22073351, ¶ 69 (Admin. App. Trib., July 31, 2003)
(noting experts’ courtesy and professionalism).
89. Halverson v. Dobler, No. 20182/03, LEXIS BC200609964, ¶¶ 17, 104, 145 (N.S.W., Dec. 1,
2006); see also Wilson v. Tier, No. 20622/2001, LEXIS BC200800781, ¶ 119 (N.S.W., Feb. 22, 2008)
(transcript from the concurrent-evidence session is reproduced in the judgment).

09_EDMOND__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC

182

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

4/2/2009 11:15:21 AM

[Vol. 72:159

due to anything other than a genuine difference of opinion about the appropriate
90
conclusion to be drawn from the known facts.

Halverson, perhaps, represents the apogee of concurrent evidence.
McClellan is a senior judge with considerable experience using the technique. It
might not be surprising, therefore, to find that concurrent evidence generally
works well in his court. This does, however, raise an important point for the
extension of concurrent evidence (and law-reform initiatives more generally).
How do the new procedures work in situations with less-accomplished, lessexperienced, and less-enthusiastic judges and commissioners? Although the
emerging case law provides a partial answer, it might not be appropriate to
evaluate concurrent evidence according to particular cases or to extrapolate
from the impressions and experiences of undoubtedly able, but perhaps not
entirely representative, judges.
Halverson, however, is also interesting for other reasons. The case
demonstrates how the decisionmaker used conventional models of science for
assessing witnesses and rationalizing the decision. Consider, for example, the
summary of the concurrent evidence of the general practitioners:
There were significant differences between the responses of the general practitioners
to some critical questions . . . . Although all of the doctors brought a useful perspective
to the various problems to my mind Dr Mackey’s evidence was of the greatest
assistance. . . . I was also impressed by Dr Bunker, who was prepared to make
reasonable and appropriate concessions which tended to qualify his primary position.
91
This was not always the case with Drs. Ford and Walsh.

Considerations such as willingness to make concessions, clarity of opinion,
reasonableness, relevant experience, and the ability to quickly and credibly
respond to alternative perspectives may help judges to choose between
divergent opinions. They can be used to attribute “objectivity” to specific
cardiologists and privilege particular performances—like those of Dr. Mackey
and Dr. Bunker—but they do not necessarily address the bases for holding
opinions: the reliability of the opinions, assumptions, and underlying facts, the
relevance of the expertise, the representativeness of the experts, or the extent of
support in authoritative literatures.
Overall, when concurrent evidence works, its success seems to be limited to
reducing the length of the trial and possibly to helping the decisionmaker
understand the expert evidence. The case law tells us little, though, about
partisanship, objectivity, the proper rate of concessions, or the deleterious
effects of adversarial bias.
B. Listening to Lawyers and Experts
Limitations with the civil-procedural reforms, and some of the strained
relations with adversarial justice, emerge more clearly from the experiences of
lawyers (barristers and solicitors) and expert witnesses. The following

90. Halverson, LEXIS BC200609964, ¶ 101 (emphasis added).
91. Id. ¶¶ 67–68.

09_EDMOND__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC

Winter 2009]

4/2/2009 11:15:21 AM

MERTON AND THE HOT TUB

183

perspectives, which do not require much explanation, were selected because
they introduce ambivalence and provide insights conspicuously absent from the
judicial encomium. They are extracted from dozens of semi-structured
interviews, discussions, and months of court observation conducted during 2007
and 2008.92
1. Interviews with Lawyers: Concurrent Evidence
“Concurrent evidence is . . . a bit like communism, good in theory but it doesn’t work
in practice.” (Solicitor)
“If you’ve got more than two witnesses it just becomes hellish.” (Barrister)
“The concurrent evidence deficiency, I see, is that people are thrown in the deep end
and perhaps the force of the personality rather than the logic of the evidence is going
to win the day.” (Barrister)
“I think it leads to a less efficient and a less forceful presentation of evidence.”
(Barrister)
“Firstly . . . the ideal of them sitting in the witness box and having this discourse with
each other never happens. . . . To the extent that they do talk to each other in the
witness box it’s usually, ‘Have you got a pencil’ rather than, ‘I think you’ve got that
wrong.’ They don’t cross-examine each other.” (Barrister)
“If I want to examine, I will cross-examine in concurrent evidence even if some
commissioners or judges think it’s undesirable, because you are still entitled to test
that person’s evidence.” (Barrister)
“The judges miss being barristers half the time because cross-examination is the best
part of the job and so they sit up on the bench and have a bit of a go.” (Barrister)

2. Interviews with Lawyers: Pretrial Meetings and Joint Reports
“Joint meetings [are] probably honest and good.” (Barrister)
“Barristers [and judges] don’t actually see all the shit that goes on before it gets to,
you know [court] . . . they are sort of living in a slightly elevated stratosphere.”
(Solicitor)
It wasn’t quick, it wasn’t cheap, and it wasn’t just. (Solicitor)

3. Interviews with Lawyers: Partisanship
“I’m not saying that there aren’t some people out there who are hired guns but people
knew who they were. The commissioners knew who they were and the judges knew
who they were and nobody would pay any attention to them, and if you wanted to go
to court and your client turned up with somebody who was one of those people, you
would say “I’m not going to court with that expert because that expert is not
somebody whose opinion is valued.” (Barrister)
“This whole idea that people make up their mind because of the check that they’re
getting is offensive.” (Barrister)

92. The author conducted more than fifty formal interviews with experts, lawyers, judges, and
court workers in N.S.W.
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“Credibility is the main thing I’m looking for. You don’t want an advocate for your
case. . . . You want . . . someone who is going to give an opinion that can be relied
upon.” (Barrister)
“I never really found there were hired guns.” (Barrister)
“I think the judiciary gets overly concerned about trying to find an expert that doesn’t
exist.” (Barrister)

4. Interviews with Lawyers: Other
[On the procedural reforms] “[I]t’s wrong if it’s solely directed to save court time and
expense. I think that’s a sad reflection on justice if we have to have to have systems
imposed on us simply to save time and money.” (Barrister)
“Judges want to initially appear progressive and they want to come up with rules that
speed things up. I would be in favour of judges that come up with rules that slow
things down. Because it might be a truism to say that justice delayed is justice denied,
but it’s certainly true that to say that cases that are rushed through are not doing the
ends of justice much of a favour either.” (Barrister)
“My experience and the experience of all my fellow practitioners is that it doesn’t save
costs.” (Barrister)
“They want it to be just quick and cheap, not ‘just, quick, and cheap.’ . . . Justice
requires that the parties feel they’ve had a fair hearing.” (Solicitor)

5. Interviews with Expert Witnesses: Concurrent Evidence
“In a lot of cases it’s unpredictable as to how it’s going to go. . . . The questions, the
issues that arise, the ability to cross-examine.”
“[E]xperts, you would hope, know more about the issues than the barristers or the
judge. So if you’re allowed to ask some questions of the other experts then you might
bring something out that no one otherwise will bring out.”
“It does give you a bit more of an opportunity to talk, only when the, generally when
the commissioner asks. . . . In my case, anyway, it’s very rare that I would unilaterally
offer some information.”
“I don’t think your client’s case is best served by pillorying the other expert. . . . I don’t
think it’s appropriate to challenge the beliefs of the other expert.”
“Cross-examination should come back into it.”

6. Interviews with Expert Witnesses: Pretrial Meetings and Joint Reports
“I think they are incredibly important to the whole process. . . . I find it astounding.
Every time I go into a joint conference I say ‘I’ll write it.’ And the other person says
‘I’m happy for you to write it and you send it to me and I’ll put in my comments.’ That
sounds just mind-blowing to me because you take control of the whole process.”
“[I]f you’ve had a joint meeting one of you has to produce a document, a document’s
produced and by a large each of the parties are able to add something else in which
they wish to emphasise. Where it gets difficult is if a person makes a particular point
and the person makes an edit and the other person responds to it . . . . It’s endless.”
“The system now is not perfect by any stretch of the imagination. Because some times
I’ve been involved in joint conferencing with other experts who have raised issues that
even the solicitors haven’t raised and wanted to raise issues that no one else had raised
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at all. I kept saying you can’t do that. You can’t raise issues that aren’t being raised.
And, they’d just ignore me.”
“Totally dependent on the attitudes of the participants.”
“It’s hideous, it’s absolutely hideous.”

7. Interviews with Expert Witnesses: Partisanship
“Give me the material and I will tell you whether or not I can support your case . . . .
And quite often the advice will be, ‘No, I can’t support your case.’ . . . That process of
saying up front whether I can or can’t support your case means that I’m not getting
instructions saying you’ve got to say this or say that.”
“Clearly my role is to express my views and to test the views of the other person. So,
both of us are being impartial but we’re representing views that we genuinely hold
which align with the views of our respective clients.”
“Certainly, when you act for a party, and they’re present, and you know you’re being
paid, you feel a little bit more heat to give the evidence that you’ve prepared.”
“I don’t ever want to be taking anything on [so] that I end up thinking that ‘I wish I
wasn’t here.’”

8. Interviews with Expert Witnesses: Other
“I think some of the other reforms, particularly the focus now on time, is just that it’s a
focus on a measure of efficiency, because its measurable, rather than a measure of
quality.”
“There’s been a move towards focusing on dispensing with things quickly which has
not necessarily created quality outcomes and better decisions.”
“Well that, of course, is the process that the court’s been going through. It’s been
reducing the time spent in court, it’s been reducing its own costs, but the costs I think
tend to be higher external to the court . . . . So, I mean the court ought to be looking at
both sides of the coin not just one. . . . It’s all very well to improve the system but
you’ve got to improve it in a way that’s going to benefit all the parties not simply one.”
“[M]y experience with my clients is that while the cost to the court may seem to have
decreased, the cost to my clients has increased by one hundred and fifty per cent.”

C. Overview
These perspectives introduce complexity. The case law and empirical
research suggests that experience with concurrent evidence is, in reality, quite
varied. The responses of other judges, lawyers, and experts are not altogether
negative, but they do not consistently align with the claims made by proponents.
These perspectives, in conjunction with discussions and court observations,
enable some generalization.
On average, lawyers tend to dislike the concurrent-evidence procedures,
especially the idiosyncratic ways in which they are implemented by the various
93
institutions and individual judges. As Seven Network Ltd. v. News Ltd.
suggests, to the extent that they introduce or accentuate uncertainty, new rules

93. (2007) 151 F.C.R. 450 (Austl.).
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and procedures tend to be unwelcome. That these reforms were twinned—
temporally and ideologically—with substantial revisions to tort law served to
heighten the misgivings of many legal practitioners.94 Even though lawyers
tended to dislike these reforms to civil procedure, those lawyers most familiar
with concurrent evidence were not always the most critical. Criticism could also
be divided according to the division of legal labor. Solicitors were more inclined
to criticize reforms to pretrial processes and barristers to speak against changes
to the adversarial character of the trial.
Experts, on the other hand, were generally favorably disposed toward
concurrent evidence, though they tended to be a little more ambivalent about
the pretrial joint conferences. They doubted their ability to substantially reduce
disagreement or reach agreement, in or out of court. Nor did they frame their
interactions with other experts in terms of partisanship or idealized norms.
Rather, recognizing that there could be genuine disagreement, several
suggested that opposing experts were sometimes incompetent and
unprofessional. Interestingly, these experts favored concurrent evidence
because it afforded an opportunity to express their views and the potential to
make opposing experts publicly accountable for their purported incompetence.
Alternatively, some expert witnesses, as the extracts reveal, were reluctant to
speak unilaterally, let alone express skepticism about the opinions of opposing
experts.
These findings, along with the discussion in Section V, suggest that the
conventional models of science and expertise underpinning the rationalization
of concurrent evidence and pretrial meetings seem to be misconceived and
misleading.
VII
CONCLUSION: A USEFUL TOOL WITH LIMITED POTENTIAL
Concurrent evidence is not a panacea for partisanship, adversarial bias, or
the difficulties created by expert disagreement and decisionmaking in the face
of uncertainty. Even when experts and lawyers cooperate and the procedures
reduce the length of proceedings, concurrent evidence can leave the fact finder
with a messy transcript and conflicting reports, and it can require more pretrial
activity and impose higher costs on the parties. Nevertheless, concurrent
evidence is not necessarily a bad thing. The procedure has the potential to
improve communication and comprehension and the conditions under which
lay fact finders make decisions about the evidence before them. The marketing
of the recent reforms, closely linked to the invocation of inappropriate models
of expertise, along with a general disinterest in empirical evidence about the
domestic litigation landscape and the value of the recent reforms, are of
concern. Notably, there seems to be little evidence to support the contention

94. See, e.g., Civil Liability Act, 2002 (N.S.W.).
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that concurrent evidence “tends to reduce the level of partisanship.”95 On the
whole, the potential of concurrent evidence seems to have been exaggerated.
The disjuncture between the models of science motivating the public
rationalization and implementation of concurrent evidence on the one hand,
and what we know about science and expertise on the other, is rather stark. The
Australian reforms seem to be predicated on antiquated and tendentious, if
pervasive, ideas about scientific conventions.96 The specter of Merton’s norms
haunts the Australian reform agenda, just as the ghost of Karl Popper
manifested in the judicial necromancy associated with Daubert.97 It might come
as a surprise to some judges, but communalism, collegiality, disinterestedness,
and skeptical attitudes do not seem to be prerequisites for contemporary
scientific activity.98
Sociologically, the origins of the Australian reforms are interesting because
the proponents, it seems, are the main beneficiaries. Under the auspices of
producing more impartial expertise, improving access to justice, and improving
in-court communications, Australian judges have unilaterally devised and
imposed procedures intended to encourage settlement, reduce the number of
issues ventilated in the courtroom, reduce costs, and render (judicial)
decisionmaking easier. The reforms move interactions between experts from
the courtroom to private pretrial spheres. They also impose new burdens on the
experts, lawyers, and parties. Most significantly, the reforms give trial judges
unprecedented control over expert evidence and consolidate judicial influence
over the early stages of proceedings. There is no evidence, and apparently
limited interest, in the question of whether the procedural reforms have
improved access to justice.
We might question the desirability of law reform, emerging fully formed,
from the apex of the dispute pyramid. One expert wondered, “Why don’t they
[the judges] engage with other people before they produce them [the civil
procedural reforms]? It just doesn’t make sense. . . . Why would you do that
without consultation?” There are good reasons, as this article has endeavored
to explain, why law reform should not be a top-down process and should not be
dominated by judges. There should have been far more consultation with
interested groups. Wider engagement might have helped proponents to
recognize some of the weaknesses and limitations with the new procedures. It

95. Heerey, supra note 39, at 391.
96. See Mike Michael, Lay Discourses of Science: Science-In-General, Science-In-Particular, and
Self, 17 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 313, 313 (1992) (exploring the influence of social institutions and
norms on the public’s understanding of science).
97. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Conjectures and Exhumations: Citations of History,
Philosophy and Sociology of Science in U.S. Federal Courts, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 309 (2002)
(discussing the use of literature from the history, philosophy, and sociology of science in federal
jurisprudence before and after Daubert).
98. See STEVEN YEARLEY, MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE: UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL STUDY
OF SCIENCE (2005); HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (Sheila Jasanoff et al. eds.,
1995).
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might have led proponents to wonder why so much of the reform agenda has
been directed toward experts rather than lawyers and judges.
Approaching civil-procedural reform from the narrow perspective of
concern about expert partisanship and institutional efficiency tends to
marginalize important dimensions of social justice. Does it make sense, for
example, to impose new procedures based on concerns about adversarial bias
when large civil defendants can simply send their legally acculturated
consultants (or employees) to any pretrial conference? More fundamentally,
focusing on local incidents of partisanship detracts from macroscopic social and
policy considerations such as the commercialization of biomedical research,
regulatory capture, the lack of publicly funded health research, questions about
who should bear the risk when profitable new products are marketed, and what
these should mean for tort and product-liability law, practice, and reform.99
At this point I want to reiterate an important, if controversial, claim. In the
absence of much empirical information or legal theorizing about expert
partisanship and bias, it is possible that they do not present particularly serious
problems in most civil matters. One of the major advantages with free proof is
that, apart from enhancing satisfaction with the legal system, it keeps the issue
of partisanship in focus. Adversarial procedures—which include scope for
vigorous cross-examination—constantly remind us of the limitations of
expertise; the intractable nature of expert disagreement; the prevalence of
alignments, commitments, and interests; and other potential biasing factors.
Expert disagreement creates problems primarily because there are no simple
means of resolving disagreement in socially legitimate ways. Attributions of bias
(and objectivity and impartiality) are unlikely to produce bright lines for
understanding or assessing particular proffers of expert evidence. They are of
limited value in determining the reliability of expert-opinion evidence or the
authenticity of disagreement and, without more, do not present constructive
bases for law reform.
For those who believe in the possibility of obtaining unbiased expertise, the
failure to obtain genuine expert evidence, along with the appearance of bias,
may represent very serious threats to legal institutions and social order.
However, more-theoretically and empirically plausible models of expertise
make simplistic models of bias (and, implicitly, objectivity and impartiality)
both less tenable and less threatening. Once we realize that strong forms of
objectivity are not attainable, we can begin to craft more-principled models of
expertise that are adequate for forensic purposes. Inevitably, there will be
ongoing debates about the meaning of adequacy, appropriate standards for

99. See Margaret Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the
Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
289, 291 (Spring/Summer 2001) (noting the ability of federal district courts to use the Daubert trilogy to
shape procedural and substantive law of toxic-tort litigation); CARL CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE,
LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (2006) (a critical assessment of judicial responses to scientific
evidence in toxic-tort litigation).
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admissibility, who should bear the burden of proof, the technical competence of
fact finders, and the extent to which rules and procedures should be uniform
across different legal domains.
At its most modest, concurrent evidence has the potential to improve
communication and comprehension in the courtroom. Concurrent evidence
may reduce costs, encourage settlement, and expedite legal proceedings, and
the presence of opposing experts may exert some discipline on witnesses.
Pretrial meetings may help to identify the main areas of difference between the
experts and reduce the time expert witnesses eventually spend in court.
Simultaneously, its use may create difficulties and introduce new risks. Whether
potential improvements in the provision and reception of testimony outweigh
hurdles and dangers is a question that probably depends on the circumstances
of individual cases, the proclivities of the participants, and the way in which
different legal systems value rights, efficiency, fairness, accuracy, public
confidence, and empirical evidence.100
Recent Australian reforms reveal much about legal conventions generally.
Legal models of science and expertise tend to be simplistic and highly idealized.
They tend to be invoked strategically in judgments and law reform to support
the predilections and interests of judges. Like their counterparts in many
common-law jurisdictions, Australian judges continue to believe that genuine
expertise thrives just beyond the courtroom and the lawyer’s office. For them,
the problem has become how to configure rules of evidence and procedures to
encourage genuine experts to produce trustworthy opinions in court.
Unfortunately there are few operational means for resolving expert
disagreement, demarcating science from nonscience, or readily determining
whether partisanship detrimentally affects the validity or reliability of particular
expert opinions. That judges believe they can implement procedural solutions
to these perennial epistemic difficulties is perhaps the most interesting aspect of
recent developments in Anglo-Australian civil procedure.

100. See Sheila Jasanoff, Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) S49, S49–S58 (2005) (arguing that the Daubert trilogy misconstrues scientific
practice and its relationship with the law).

